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Nomenclature 
CSG  = Chemical Steam Generator 
CBM  = Condition Based Maintenance 
DIaK  = Data, Information, and Knowledge 
DIaKA  = Data, Information, and Knowledge Architecture 
FCL  = Functional Capability Level 
FMEA  = Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
GN  = Gaseous Nitrogen 
IMBT  = ISHM Model Building Toolkit 
IPA  = Isopropyl Alcohol 
IS  = Intelligent Sensor 
ISHM  = Integrated Systems Health Management 
ISHM-DM = ISHM Domain Model 
KSC  = Kennedy Space Center 
LC-20  = Launch Complex 20 
LOX  = Liquid Oxygen 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCAP  = Network Capable Application Processor 
OSA-CBM = Open Systems Architecture for Condition-Based Maintenance 
RCA  = Root Cause Analysis 
RETS  = Rocket Engine Test Stand 
S4  = Systematic Sensor Selection Strategy 
SS  = Smart Sensor 
S&As  = Sensors and Actuators 
SS&As  = Smart Sensors and Actuators 
SSC  = Stennis Space Center 
STE  = Special Test Equipment 
TCP/IP  = Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TEDS  = Transducer Electronic Data Sheet 
TIM  = Transducer Interface Module 
VISE  = Virtual Intelligent Sensor Environment 
I. Abstract 
He implementation of an integrated system health management (ISHM) capability is fundamentally linked to 
the management of data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) with the purposeful objective of determining the 
health of a system. Management implies storage, distribution, sharing, maintenance, processing, reasoning, and 
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presentation. ISHM is akin to having a team of experts who are all individually and collectively observing and 
analyzing a complex system, and communicating effectively with each other in order to arrive at an accurate and 
reliable assessment of its health. In this chapter, concepts, procedures, and approaches are presented as a foundation 
for implementing an ISHM capability relevant to intelligent systems. The capability stresses integration of DIaK 
from all elements of a system, emphasizing an advance toward an on-board, autonomous capability. Both ground-
based and on-board ISHM capabilities are addressed. The information presented is the result of many years of 
research, development, and maturation of technologies, and of prototype implementations in operational systems. 
II. Introduction 
In this chapter, Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is presented as an enabling 
discipline/technology area for intelligent systems, as well as a capability that embodies “intelligence” in itself. To 
that end, a variety of intelligent systems-relevant ISHM topics are addressed, including relevant examples. The 
information presented provides the reader with an understanding of the state-of-the-art, current research, and 
challenges that are relevant to ISHM as a core capability of an intelligent system. 
ISHM has been defined from many perspectives. Here it is defined as a capability that is achieved by integrating 
data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) that is conceptually and/or physically distributed throughout the system 
elements (which inherently implies the capability to manage DIaK associated with distributed sub-systems). The 
term DIaK management encompasses contextual and timely storage, distribution, sharing, maintenance, processing, 
reasoning, and presentation. This paradigm implies that DIaK must be available to any element of a system at the 
right time and in accordance with a meaningful context. ISHM Functional Capability Level (FCL) is measured by 
how well a system performs the following functions: (1) detect anomalies, (2) diagnose causes, (3) predict future 
anomalies/failures, (4) enable efficient integration and execution of all phases of the life-cycle of a system from a 
systems engineering perspective, and (5) provide the user with an integrated awareness about the condition of 
important elements of the system as a means of guiding user decisions. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section III describes core areas of ISHM capability development, including 
standards and related architectures, the ISHM knowledge model, software tools, intelligent sensors and components, 
and sensor selection and placement. Section IV describes ISHM in the context of systems design, integration, and 
engineering. Section V describes briefly controls for ISHM-Enabled systems. Section VI describes briefly 
opportunities for advances in validation and verification of ISHM systems. Section VII includes examples of some 
relevant implementations, and Section VIII provides conclusions and recommendations on the way forward. 
III. ISHM Capability Development 
ISHM functions are currently performed manually. For complex systems; it involves many people; it is very costly 
and difficult to improve with time and use; it involves minimal integration of DIaK across the system; it is not 
comprehensive (does not include all elements of a system or much DIaK about the system); and it is not continuous 
(a people-based system is generally not vigilant 24 hours a day, every day). Figure 1 describes the layered approach 
currently employed to achieve ISHM capability. At the top layer, Layer 1, on-board ISHM capability is deployed. At 
the moment, this amounts to monitoring thresholds on a few sensor measurements in order to avoid catastrophic 
events. Only events (anomalies) are detected, which are used by people in the lower layers to reason and infer what 
the associated anomaly might be; diagnose its causes, etc. Layers 2 to 4 involve people in increasing numbers, and 
even entire organizations aligned with individuals in the control/evaluation rooms. ISHM capability on-board the 
system is expected to enable faster and more accurate analysis, reasoning, and decision making in layers 2-4. 
There are a number of implementations of ISHM capability since before 2000. NASA GRC led some advances 
in health management for propulsion systems [1]. These efforts included a combination of sensor validation methods 
and expert systems for diagnosis, applied to rocket engine test post diagnostics. Another example is the Boeing’s 
777 Airplane Health Management (AHM) system [2]. AHM involves a central maintenance computer that collects 
information from many subsystems that encompass built-in test elements. AHM’s purpose was to decrease 
unplanned maintenance from the 75% level to a 25% level. This level of improvement could only possible by 
augmenting the knowledge and information base in isolated subsystems, through processing and reasoning across 
subsystems. This strategy was supported by the AHM architecture. Boeing and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne 
implemented the Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) in the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) [3]. 
AHMS was developed to meet more stringent engine reliability requirements. The long term goals were ambitious, 
encompassing an integrated approach to detect anomalies, diagnose causes, and predict future anomalies; however, 
only a first phase was implemented, encompassing monitoring of vibration sensors mounted on the high-pressure 
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fuel turbopump and high-pressure oxidizer turbopump. AHMS was certified and used in flight, with the authority to 
shut down the engine. 
Another attempt to advance ISHM capability implementation was embodied by NASA’s Propulsion IVHM 
Technology Experiment (PITEX), where IVHM stands for Integrated Vehicle Health Management. PITEX 
implemented an architecture that represented system elements with state models, and used states of system 
parameters to reason and make decisions about the health of the elements. PITEX used the software environment 
Livingstone to model a propulsion system composed of tanks, valves, and other basic elements; it was tested using 
simulated data [4].  
A system that has been in use for a long time is the Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) for 
helicopters (a web search will provide a large number of references). The HUMS monitors data from helicopter 
subsystems and processes it using a set of specialized algorithms.  The resulting anomaly indicators and original 
data are used by experts to infer if critical elements might be trending toward failure. In this system, knowledge and 
its integrated interpretation is primarily done by people. 
Although the references cited above implement ISHM to some level of capability, they do not represent 
“intelligent” implementations that would encompass embedded DIaK, nor embrace intelligent systems architectures, 
paradigms, or ontologies. The following sections describe technologies, tools, and infrastructure needed to achieve 
ISHM capability that is mainly on-board the system, affordable and evolutionary throughout the life of the system, 
integrates DIaK across the system, is continuous, and is comprehensive. In order to make this possible, it is 
necessary that the ISHM capability must incorporate a knowledge-based approach, and hence embody 
“intelligence.” 
A. Standards for ISHM Implementation 
The development of an ISHM capability requires the use of models (knowledge) applied to information and data 
associated with various elements that make up a system. Here, the term “model” is used in the broadest sense as it 
may include qualitative (e.g. heuristics), analytic, statistical, fuzzy-logic, classic logic, artificial neural network and 
other types of models. Use of models is enabled by management of DIaK, encompassing storage, distribution, 
sharing, maintenance, processing, reasoning, and presentation. In order to make this possible in a generic manner, 
meaning not for a specific application; standards must be established so that DIaK can be managed in a plug&play 
and interoperable manner, and for affordability. 
Standards for ISHM must be at a high enough layer in the infrastructure so that they are largely independent of the 
physical (e.g. Ethernet) and transmission (e.g. TCP/IP) layers. Example standards for ISHM include the IEEE 1451 
 
 
Figure 1. Description of a layered ISHM capability as is done today. 
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family of standards for smart sensors and actuators, the Open Systems Architecture for Condition-Based 
Maintenance (OSA-CBM) standard, and the Open systems Architecture for Enterprise (OSA-EAI) standard 
managed by the Machine Information Management Open Standards Alliance (MIMOSA). These standards are 
sufficiently abstracted so that they can be implemented as part of any physical or transmission architecture. 
 
1. IEEE 1451 Family of Standards for Smart Sensors and Actuators (SS&A) 
 
The IEEE 1451 family of standards was developed by government and private entities under the leadership of 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Reference [5] provides a summary of the standards and 
their use. In creating these standards, the objective was to standardize DIaK associated with sensors and actuators 
(S&As). The standards are described as a family because, as evidenced from the quote in the following paragraph, 
they address various elements and functions of Smart Sensors and Actuators (SS&As). The notion is that SS&As 
must incorporate DIaK related to their functionality and provide their DIaK, via a communications network, to other 
systems or functions that use and manage S&As. 
 
“The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 1451 smart transducer interface standards 
provide the common interface and enabling technology for the connectivity of transducers to microprocessors, 
control and field networks, and data acquisition and instrumentation systems. The standardized TEDS specified by 
IEEE 1451.2 allows the self-description of sensors and the interfaces provide a standardized mechanism to facilitate 
the plug and play of sensors to networks. The network-independent smart transducer object model defined by IEEE 
1451.1 allows sensor manufacturers to support multiple networks and protocols. Thus, transducer-to-network 
interoperability is on the horizon. The inclusion of P1451.3 and P1451.4 to the family of 1451 standards will meet 
the needs of the analog transducer users for high-speed applications. In the long run, transducer vendors and users, 
system integrators and network providers can all benefit from the IEEE 1451 interface standards [6].” 
 
The most common physical architectures for systems are bus-based multi-drop configurations. Figure 2 shows 
configurations and implementation of IEEE 1451 standards, and a short summary is provided below. The standards 
are still being modified, but the intent here is to provide a sense of how the standards can be used to enable 
interoperability and plug&play capability with networked transducers encompassing embedded information (hence, 
smart transducers). 
 
IEEE P1451.0 defines a set of common commands, common operations, and Transducer Electronic Data Sheet 
(TEDS) for the family of IEEE 1451 standards. The commands allow communication with sensors or actuators in 
IEEE 1451-based wired and wireless networks. The functionality is independent of the physical communications 
media and the network node called Network Capable Application Processor (NCAP).  
 
IEEE 1451.1 defines a common object model describing the behavior of smart transducers (sensor and actuators). It 
defines the communication models used for the standard, which include the client-server and publish-subscribe 
models. Application software based on IEEE 1451; running in the NCAP, communicate with transducers through 
any physical layer standards as needed for a particular application. The standard enables communications among 
NCAPs and to higher level systems, in a network neutral manner. 
 
IEEE 1451.2 defines transducers-to-NCAP interface and TEDS for a point-to-point configuration. Transducers are 
part of a Transducer Interface Module (TIM). The original standard describes a communication layer based on 
enhanced SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) with additional HW lines for flow control and timing. 
 
IEEE 1451.3 defines a transducer-to-NCAP interface and TEDS for multi-drop transducers using a distributed 
communications architecture. It allows many transducers to be arrayed as nodes, on a multi-drop transducer 
network, sharing a common pair of wires. 
 
IEEE 1451.4 defines a mixed-mode interface for analog transducers with analog and digital operating modes. A 
TEDS was added to a traditional two-wire, constant current excited sensor containing a FET amplifier. The TEDS 
model was also refined to include critical information that must fit in a small memory device, needed by very small 
transducers. Templates are used to describe the data structure of TEDS. The current templates cover accelerometers, 
strain gages, current loop sensors, microphones, thermocouples, and others. 
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IEEE P1451.5 defines a transducer-to-NCAP interface and TEDS for wireless transducers. Wireless communication 
protocol standards such as 802.11 (WiFi), 802.15.1 (Bluetooth), 802.15.4 (ZigBee) are being considered as some of 
the physical interfaces for IEEE P1451.5. The objective is to be able to communicate with a wireless transducer 
embodying any of these three wireless protocols. 
 
IEEE P1451.6 defines a transducer-to-NCAP interface and TEDS using the high-speed CANopen network interface. 
Both intrinsically safe and non-intrinsically safe applications are supported. It defines a mapping of the 1451 TEDS 
to the CANopen dictionary entries as well as communication messages, process data, configuration parameter, and 
diagnosis information. It adopts the CANopen device profile for measuring devices and closed-loop controllers. 
 
2. OSA-CBM Standard 
 
The OSA-CBM standard was developed by government and private entities. This standard addresses 
management of health information from any element, subsystem, system, or system-of-systems. The foundation is 
the definition of layers where health information is organized according to the degree of processing, and hence 
amount of DIaK employed, to determine health condition (Figure 3) [7, 8]. The standard focuses on automated real-
time management of health information. In contrast, health management over extended periods of time (non-real 
time) is typically based on large databases, and done primarily by people. The non real-time approach is 
standardized as the Open Systems Architecture for Enterprise Application Integration (OSA-EAI) Standard. Both 
standards are maintained by the Machine Information Management Open Standards Alliance (MIMOSA) 
organization [7]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. IEEE 1451 Family of Standards (Courtesy of Dr. Kang Lee from NIST). 
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3. Machine Information Management Open Standards Alliance (MIMOSA) 
 
MIMOSA “is a non-profit trade association dedicated to developing and encouraging the adoption of open 
information standards for Operations and Maintenance in manufacturing, fleet, and facility environments. 
MIMOSA's open standards enable collaborative asset lifecycle management in both commercial and military 
applications.” [7]. 
 
4. Example Implementation of IEEE 1451 and OSA-CBM Standards 
 
Figure 4 shows a physical architecture (bus-based, multi drop, Ethernet network) for a pilot ISHM system 
implemented at NASA Kennedy Space Center, Launch Complex 20 (LC-20) [8]. The architecture is hierarchical, 
with buses at various levels, where higher-level information flows up toward the site-wide management computer. 
This is a typical architecture for systems in most industries, including aerospace. Standards were implemented in the 
lower part of the physical architecture (bus showing IEEE 1451.1 and OSA-CBM standards on Ethernet), but it was 
sufficient to demonstrate the impact of standards for ISHM implementation in an operational system, during a test at 
the LC-20. 
The experiment demonstrated interoperability of ISHM systems developed by three different providers: NASA 
Stennis Space Center (NASA SSC), NASA Kennedy Space Center (NASA KSC), and the Pennsylvania State 
University’s Applied Research Laboratory (PSU-ARL). The interoperability was enabled through the use of the 
IEEE 1451 and OSA-CBM standards. 
 
Figure 3. CBM layered health DIaK architecture. 
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B. ISHM Knowledge Model (ISHM-DM) 
The concept of an ISHM Domain Model (ISHM-DM) has been introduced previously [9, 10]. ISHM-DM 
embodies DIaK that is needed to achieve ISHM capability; including system element identification and 
specifications, and inter-element relationships used in reasoning approaches. Data is available from sensors and 
components. Distribution of DIaK associated among the physical elements of a system gives rise to an ISHM 
architecture that enables distributed management of DIaK to achieve ISHM functionality. The ISHM architecture is 
a DIaK  Architecture (DIaKA), where intelligent processes (e.g. physics-based models) providing various degrees of 
integration (through inter-dependencies) are used to achieve the desired ISHM capability; and where DIaK are 
managed in a distributed manner (Figure 5). This hierarchical architecture enables abstracting models of processes 
occurring throughout the system (e.g. tank pressurization, subsystem leak, valve leak, sensor flat, etc.), and is 
conceptually different from a typical architecture depicting the physical composition of a system, where the 
hierarchy is based on simpler physical elements being assembled into more complex sub-systems and systems. 
Figure 6 is another depiction of the DIaKA. DIaK are distributed among the elements of a system, including 
sensors, actuators, and components; as well as subsystems, and systems. The icons represent active repositories of 
data and information pertinent to their function, operation, and health. The icons also represent process models 
(knowledge) that enable ISHM functionality. Figure 6 shows a representation of the DIakA as it is related to an 
ISHM-DM of a simple rocket test stand system.  
 
Figure 4. Architecture for pilot ISHM system implemented at NASA Kennedy Space 
Center, Launch Complex 20 (LC-20) showing the use of IEEE 1451.1, OSA-CBM, and 
OSA-EAI standards. 
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The DIaKA supports the following paradigm. Sensor icons are repositories for sensor processes that operate on 
measurements within a local context, independent of other elements of the system. Sensor processes are, for 
example, algorithms to determine level of noise, changes on level of noise, flat signals, time response characteristics, 
etc. In addition, sensor processes include health assessment processes focused on determining: sensor health, and the 
quality of the measurement. Health assessment sensor processes also receive information from other processes 
higher in the hierarchy to improve their health assessment. For example, a process model of flow from a tank 
through a valve, to atmosphere; can allow consistency checks among pressure and temperature sensors along the 
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Figure 6. DIaKA showing the correspondence of practical ISHM-DM elements adapted for a small rocket test 
stand. Process models are executed often in parallel for consistency checking that leads to anomaly detection 
and reasoning about health of processes, sensors, and components. 
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path of the flow. If one sensor is inconsistent with the model, this information is fed back to the sensor to improve 
its own health assessment and anomaly determination. The same applies to component processes. The final objective 
is to determine the health of sensors and components; and do it with maximum utilization of DIaK embodied in the 
various layers of processes in the hierarchy. This approach is described in reference [9]. 
C. Software Capabilities to Develop ISHM Domain Models 
Core capabilities of ISHM include: (1) detect anomalies, (2) diagnose causes, (3) predict future 
anomalies/failures, (4) enable efficient integration and execution of all phases of the life-cycle of a system from a 
systems engineering perspective, and (5) provide the user with an integrated awareness about the condition of 
important elements of the system as a means of guiding user decisions.  These capabilities are to provide continuous 
and comprehensive awareness about the health of every element of a system. DIaK must be employed to do the 
reasoning leading to achieving the core capabilities. Furthermore, multiple simultaneous process models and 
approaches should be employed to achieve maximum functional capability level (FCL), that is to make effective use 
of all DIaK embodied in the ISHM-DM. A software system for ISHM capability should support all core capabilities 
by integrating systematically DIaK through the ISHM-DM. The following requirements should be met by the 
software system: 
Object representation: object representation of system physical elements and associated process models is the best 
way to embed DIaK in a systematic and in an organized manner. Object orientation also embodies re-use of software 
that is modularized into objects, and allows a more intuitive understanding of the code and its outcomes. 
Distribution of ISHM-DM’s within and across networks: ISHM-DM’s might be distributed among processors 
connected to a network, simply because it is necessary to use parallel processing, and/or ISHM-DM’s might be 
created by different people in various geographic locations. As complexity of systems increase, and/or a large 
number of process models are used in achieving effective ISHM capability, it is not reasonable or manageable to do 
this with a centralized architecture. 
Distribution across processing units: Since multiple process models are expected to be running at any given time, 
the software environments should support parallel processing. 
Inference engine: Many tasks require an inference engine. Reasoning and decision making leading to anomaly 
detection, diagnostics, effects, and prognostics; require contextual integrity and cause-effect analysis using 
heterogeneous data and information. The inference engine must also allow accurate representation and automatic 
execution of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). 
Integrated management of distributed DIaK: DIaK must be managed in a way to allow embodiment of systems 
thinking across elements and subsystems. Often this is enabled by definitions of relationships among elements of 
systems that can be physically visible (i.e. attached to, belong to a system); or more abstracted relationships, as it 
relates to involvement in process models (e.g. pressure sensors associated to a particular subsystem, subsystem 
definitions that change with configuration, etc.). 
Definition of dynamic relationships among objects for use in reasoning: Often, the framework for reasoning and 
application of process models changes dynamically with configuration changes, stages of operation, etc. This also 
means that relationships among objects and processes change dynamically, and must be represented in the ISHM-
DM’s. For example, reasoning to detect leaks in a sealed subsystem requires that membership of elements to sealed 
subsystems must change with valve state changes. 
Iconic representation of systems objects with visible and virtual links (relationships) used to provide intuitive 
representation of reasoning and context: The mix of object representation and iconic representation of DIaK 
provides the ability to intuitively visualize interrelationships and dig deep into details of the ISHM system. As 
complexity increases, graphical programming and visualization become essential. 
A software environment developed by NASA Stennis Space Center and General Atomics [9-13] meets all of the 
requirements above. The software was developed using G2 [14], which is a commercial programming environment 
for implementation of intelligent applications. Other software environments for creation of knowledge models 
include TEAMS [25] and MADe [26] for automating failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), and Livingston for 
state-machine models [24]. 
D. Intelligent Sensors and Components 
The lower elements in the DIaKA (Figure 6) represent processes associated with sensors and components; where 
“components” is intended to encompass any element that is not a sensor; e.g. tanks, pumps, etc.  These elements 
directly represent physical entities in the system; and, in the future, they are expected to incorporate their own 
embedded processing and networking capabilities. This is already true for sensors, as many “intelligent sensor” 
concepts are now available commercially, and more are in development [15, 16]. 
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There are many definitions for “Intelligent Sensor” or IS. The following definition is based on the foundation 
provided by the IEEE 1451 family of standards for Smart Sensors and Actuators. It is reasonable to assume that the 
standard defines a “Smart Sensor (SS),” as described previously in Section A “Standards for ISHM 
Implementation.” “Intelligent Sensor” is therefore a “Smart Sensor” with the ability to provide the following 
functionality: (1) measurement, (2) assessment of the quality of the measurement, and (3) determination of the 
“health” of the sensor. The better the sensor provides functionalities 2 and 3, the more intelligent it is. 
Implementation of IS’s can be done in many ways. Commercial SS incorporating TEDS in-a-chip have been 
available for some time (a web search will reveal many offerings). Some IS or SS modules have been developed in 
industry. These are small format units that incorporate signal conditioning, data acquisition, processing capability, 
and protocols for communicating as network elements [15, 16]. In other cases, IS capability is enabled by a 
combination of hardware and software that turns classic sensors into smart sensors; as is the case with products from 
National Instruments [17]. Intelligent sensor functionality has also been implemented purely in software, again, to 
turn classic sensors into intelligent ones. Figure 7 shows the configuration of a pilot ISHM implementation for a 
rocket engine test stand. Here the Virtual Intelligent Sensor Environment (VISE) turns all classic test-stand sensors 
into intelligent sensors [10]. The VISE publishes IS data and information to a bus for consumption by the ISHM 
system and other users such as repositories and visualization systems. Some of the processes to be embedded in IS’s 
include:  
 Noise Level Assessment and History 
 Spike Detection and History 
 Flat Signal Detection and History 
 Response Time Characterization 
 Intermittency Characterization and History 
 Physical Detachment Characterization and History 
 Regime Characterization and History 
 Curve Fit on Identified Regimes 
 
 
E. Optimizing sensor selection and placement for ISHM 
When developing an ISHM capability from the ground up, one must optimize sensor suites to achieve maximum 
functional capability (anomaly detection, diagnosis, effects, prognostics). References [18-22] provide context for 
 
Figure 7. Architecture showing implementation of intelligent sensors through the 
Virtual Intelligent Sensor Environment. 
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this section. For example, the Systematic Sensor Selection Strategy (S4) is a model-based procedure for 
systematically and quantitatively identifying the sensor compliment that optimally achieves the health assessment 
goals of a system. Properly formulated, an S4 application can be used to determine whether or not existing sensors 
meet requirements for system health assessment; and, if not, to justify the addition of sensors that allow those 
requirements to be met. As shown in Figure 8, S4 can be logically partitioned into three major elements: the 
Knowledge Base, the Iterative Down-Select Process, and the Final Selection Process. The Knowledge Base consists 
of system design information and heritage experience together with a focus on components with health implications. 
The Iterative Down-Select Process identifies a group or groups of sensors that provide the highest fault detection 
and isolation performance for targeted fault scenarios. This process is further composed of three basic modules: the 
system diagnostic model, the sensor suite merit algorithm, and the down-select algorithm. The result of the Iterative 
Down-Select Process is a single sensor suite with the highest merit algorithm score (i.e., optimal) or a group of 
highest-performing (i.e., nearly-optimal) sensor suites with closely-matched merit algorithm scores. In the final 
selection process, the group of highest performing sensor suites is evaluated using a statistical algorithm that 
provides the final robustness test for each sensor suite. The result of the Final Selection Process is a sensor suite that 
optimally achieves the system health assessment goals. 
 
IV. ISHM in Systems Design, Integration, and Engineering 
Systems Integration and Engineering (SI&E) practices are employed to build complex systems. SI&E for 
aerospace systems has developed into its own discipline, although theories and concepts have not been thoroughly 
formalized in an academic sense. NASA has published its formalized procedures (NPR xxxx) to standardize and 
promote the practice across the agency. The role of ISHM in SI&E is linked to the concept of ISHM-DM’s, whereby 
every element that is part of a system comes with its own ISHM-DM that can be rolled-up into an overall system 
ISHM-DM in a plug&play mode. In this sense, when two elements are assembled, the ISHM-DM of each element is 
incorporated into the ISHM-DM of the assembly. In this manner, DIaK compartmentalized in each element becomes 
immediately available to the ISHM-DM of the assembly. Figure 9 shows how currently systems integration is done, 
where knowledge and information resides with people and documents. In contrast, Figure 10 shows the concept of 
systems integration using systems with embedded knowledge (ISHM-DM’s) providing comprehensive and 
continuous vigilance on the health of the elements throughout the integration process. This results in systems with 
embedded DIaK, and the respective decrease of burden on people working with the system, and decreased 
dependence on off-board documentation. 
The incorporation of ISHM-DM’s as products of the design implies that parts of a system must be accompanied 
by DIaK relevant to determining health of the parts. Failure modes and effects must be captured, as well as 
information such as expected life, specifications, usage, operational environments, etc. Specific advantages of 
integrating intelligent systems include: 
• Modular intelligent systems with advanced ISHM capability. 
 
 
Figure 8. ISHM Sensor Selection Strategy (S4) for optimizing 
sensor selection and placement. 
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• Faster and reliable integration, verification, validation, test, and mission readiness assessment. 
• Complete and continues visibility of system condition throughout life-cycle. 
• Decreased life-cycle costs. 
• Highly self-sufficient systems. 
• Efficient evolution to future systems, as one builds upon integrated subsystems with embedded knowledge.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Systems Integration today. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Systems Integration of subsystems with embedded ISHM. 
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V. Intelligent Control for ISHM-Enabled Systems 
Control of complex systems that are ISHM-enabled is a nascent area, simply because ISHM itself is also relatively 
new. The objective is for the control function to make use of system health information in order to achieve its 
objectives. Suspect (i.e., disqualified) sensors might removed from use by critical control functions; anomalous 
components might need to be contained in order to maintain system function; and, in severe cases, new mission 
objectives may need to be identified. The paradigm implies that control systems become users of health information, 
while at the same time making use of actuators to help further improve determination of the system health. This can 
lead to yet another area of control, specifically focused on helping the ISHM capability detect anomalies, diagnose 
causes, and determine effects. An example of a control system that incorporates sensor and actuator health 
information communicated using the IEEE 1451.1 Standard is described in reference [23]. 
 
Figure 11 shows a system diagram for a control strategy experiment that incorporates sensor and actuator health, 
where two key standards in the IEEE 1451 family of standards for smart sensors and actuators were used [23]. The 
standards implemented include the Transducer Electronic Data Sheet (for automatic identification and 
specifications), and the NCAP (Network Capable Application Program) used to communicate with the intelligent 
sensor. The control strategy selects algorithms depending on what faults sensors and/or actuators might exhibit. 
VI. Opportunities and Need for Advances in Verification and Validation 
The entire chapter essentially describes ISHM capability implementation as purposeful management of DIaK with 
a focus on determining the health of each element in a system. The need to use knowledge, and hence inference 
engines; and the complexities of parallel processing and reconciliation of potentially inconsistent outcomes that lead 
to anomaly determination; requires advances in verification and validation of the ISHM capability itself. This 
manuscript only raises this issue, but the scope of this topic is broad, it is generic to knowledge-based systems, and 
is left to be addressed by other colleagues. 
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Figure 11. Example control for health-enabled system. 
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VII. Implementation Example: Rocket Engine Test Facility and Test Article 
A core pilot ISHM capability implementation was done for a rocket engine test stand and its test article 
(chemical steam generator) at NASA Stennis Space Center, MS. Details are provided in reference [11]. Multiple 
objectives were achieved that incorporate many of the technologies, tools, and capabilities discussed in this chapter, 
but the most significant outcome was to achieve an implementation on an operational system, and use it in real-time, 
during operations. 
The implementation embodied a physical systems architecture that is shown in Figure 7. Intelligent sensor 
functionality was achieved using the Virtual Intelligent Sensor Environment (VISE). This environment is able to 
process real-time data streamed from the data bus in the Test Control Center (TCC), or use historical data from files. 
In this case, real-time meant processing approximately 300 sensors/signals streaming at a rate of 250 samples/sec. 
The VISE transforms every sensor and signal from the facility into its “intelligent” version. That is, it includes a 
Transducer Electronic Data Sheet (TEDS) for each sensor/signal; processes data streams to capture anomaly 
indicators, checks for exceedances on specification limits, and streams data to a bus using the IEEE 1451.1 standard 
for communications by smart sensors and actuators or NCAP (Network Capable Application Process). Data and 
sensor health information is also stored in the Health Assessment Database System (HADS) for analysis off-line. 
Intelligent sensor information (measurement plus health variables) are consumed by the ISHM-DM of the system, 
running in the ISHM (G2) computer. The VISE’s software architecture is modular, and can systematically be 
configured to accommodate more sensors and incorporate additional processes that operate on the measurement 
streams. 
      
 
ISHM-DM of CSG and Test Facility Systems     Image of CSG System installed in the Test Stand. 
 
Figure 12. ISHM-DM and Image of System. 
    
 
Figure 13. Detail ISHM-DM shown by clicking on the “CSG LOX System” object from the top level 
diagram. 
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The ISHM-DM was developed using a toolkit built jointly by NASA and General Atomics (San Diego, CA) in 
the G2 environment [14]. A description of the General Atomics version is provided in Reference [12]. The DM 
includes subsystems of the test stand (ovals), subsystems that feed the test article (shown on left of CSG Unit 1), and 
the test article itself (CSG units, where only one is active to satisfy initial objectives of the test program). Figure 12 
shows a top view of the ISHM-DM (left), and an image of the system (right). Each entity in the ISHM-DM 
represents an object, and any system is a collection of interconnected objects, derived directly from schematic 
diagrams. Figure 13 shows details of the CSG LOX System displaying interconnected objects directly translated 
from the system schematic. Each element (pipe, elbow, valve, sensor, etc.) is an “intelligent” object that incorporates 
information describing who it is (ID and TEDS), what it is (class of object … such as a valve), and what it can do 
(parameters relevant to process models where the objects partake, for example operational limits from TEDS or 
component specifications, or potential failure modes). Figure 14 shows a top level DM window along with sub-
windows with lists of objects, sensor TEDS, redline/blueline warning and occurrence lists. . 
 
When creating an ISHM-DM, 
the software automatically 
generates a knowledge base (KB). 
Objects are selected from a library 
in the toolkit, dropped in a 
workspace, and connected to reflect 
the schematic diagram. The KB 
generates configuration information 
derived from interconnections 
(what is connected to what) made at 
the moment objects are created and 
connected. These connection 
relationships are available for 
reasoning that might be done with 
multiple tools typical of object-
oriented environments with an 
inference engine: procedures, 
methods, rules, and root-cause 
trees. Class membership 
relationships are also inherent in the object classes; for example, a temperature sensor is a member of the higher 
level sensor class. Figure 15 shows a generic object class architecture suitable for creating ISHM-DM’s. Multiple-
inheritance can enable incorporating various categories of information for each object, e.g. specifications, process 
models associations, principles of operation, etc.  
 
An example that illustrates forcefully the 
need for a knowledge-based ISHM-DM is 
the implementation of a strategy to detect 
leaks in isolated subsystems. This strategy is 
a common sense method of checking for 
leaks by operators. The condition for the leak 
check is to identify isolated subsystems that, 
by definition, should maintain pressure 
levels. Then identify pressure sensors in the 
subsystem and check if pressure is 
maintained. If not, then the subsystem is 
leaking. That means that, in first instance, all 
member elements of the subsystem are 
suspect of leak, creating an ambiguity group. 
Additional information is used to reduce the 
ambiguity to a minimum number of suspect 
or confirmed leak sources. Figure 16 shows 
the steps as implemented within the ISHM-
 
Figure14. An interface screen showing a top view of the ISHM-DM,  
along with windows containing information regarding TEDS and 
alarms 
 
 
Figure 15. Example Object Class Definitions for 
ISHM-DM’s  
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DM. At system initialization, a procedure searches (navigates) through pipe objects, noting valves or other isolation 
elements. Note that all the necessary information for this process is part of the class object definitions in the ISHM-
DM (valve states, connection relationships, 
sources of fluids, etc.). When all IsoSubs 
are identified, then, for each IsoSub, the 
procedure checks if any pressure sensors 
exist. This means that the procedure does 
not require that special sensors be installed, 
instead, it works with what is there. If an 
IsoSub does not have any pressure sensors, 
the procedure does not draw any 
conclusions about that IsoSub. For IsoSubs 
with pressure sensors, the procedure checks 
if pressure is maintained. Note that other 
reasoning can be applied as well to decide 
on whether the sensor measurements can be 
trusted, and to what degree. That 
assessment is being done through core 
procedures that take into account 
information from intelligent sensors and 
consistency checking through process 
models where the sensors are involved. In 
any case, if pressure is maintained, the 
procedure enters a monitoring/checking loop pertaining to any valve (or isolation element) configuration changes. If 
any occur, then only those IsoSubs affected by the valve with changed configuration are analyzed to determine 
deleted and newly formed IsoSubs. After initialization, the loop runs on a time schedule, but adjusting the IsoSubs 
occurs every time a valve (or isolation object) change configuration. 
When the procedure detects a leak event in the IsoSub, 
it is sent to the leak for IsoSubs node of the generic root-
cause tree, and instantiated for the particular members of 
the leaking IsoSub. Figure 17 shows a generic tree for 
determining causes and effects of leak. The diagram 
constitutes the code itself; which is very expressive, 
drawing from information embedded in objects in the 
ISHM-DM. The tree indicates that a leak event in any 
is2_flow-subsystem (what has been called an IsoSub) can 
be caused by leaks on any is2_process-equipment (any 
element) that is a-
subcomponent of the 
IsoSub, but also treats 
separately a 
subcomponent that is an 
isolation valve. The 
reason is that isolation 
valves belong to 
adjacent IsoSubs, and if 
the adjacent IsoSub is 
not leaking, then one 
can immediately 
conclude that the valve 
is not leaking, thus 
reducing the size of the 
ambiguity group that 
may be causing the 
leak. 
 
Figure 16. Functional Diagram for Leak Detection in 
Isolated Subsystems. 
 
 
Figure 17. Root-Cause Tree for diagnosis of leak 
 Detection in Isolated Subsystems. 
 
 
 
Subsystem Leaking 
 
Subsystem not 
Leaking 
 
Figure 18. Example instantiation of a root-cause tree for a leak event in an 
Isolated Subsystem. 
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Figure 18 shows the occurrence of an instantiation of a leak event in an IsoSub. The  right  side shows a diagram 
(ISHM-DM) of a gaseous oxygen (GOX) and gaseous nitrogen (GN) subsystems of a simple experimental rocket 
engine test stand. The leak detection procedure has identified all IsoSubs, including the two marked within the red 
oval spaces. Pressure decrease in the sensor on the left has created a leak event in that subsystem. The event has 
been sent to the generic root-cause for leak (Figure 17), and instantiated for that subsystem. When that happens, a 
detailed cause-effect diagram involving all elements in the subsystem is automatically created. Nodes for each 
subcomponent of the leaking IsoSub are overlaid with indicators that describe them as suspect (S), false (F), true 
(T), and also if the indication is inferred or direct. Note that the node corresponding to the valve isolating the two 
IsoSubs has an F indicator, meaning that it is not leaking. The other node for the valve also indicates that it is false 
that the valve has an anomaly called “failure to seat.” This conclusion comes from other root-cause trees describing 
failure modes of valves. 
VIII. Conclusion 
This paper describes concepts, architectures, paradigms, tools, and implementations of ISHM capability. The 
purpose is to show that ISHM capability must be implemented as a Knowledge-based capability, through 
management of data, information, and knowledge (DIaK); whereby “management” implies storage, distribution, 
sharing, maintenance, processing, reasoning, and presentation. The emphasis is also to note that ISHM capability 
increments “intelligence” of the system where it is implemented. We can then talk about ISHM-Enabled systems; 
with a potential to generate significant advances in Systems Design, Integration, and Engineering; as well as in 
Systems Control. The reader should also infer that much work is needed in developing ISHM-DM’s, tools to create 
and use the ISHM-DM’s, and implementation of standards for management of DIaK to achieve Plug&Play and 
interoperability. The concept of ISHM-DM encompasses an integrating knowledge model about the entire system, 
specially incorporating knowledge that makes possible automating interactions and analysis, and use in reasoning 
and decision making. Last, but not least, it is important to note that the ISHM DIaK Architecture (DIaKA) described 
addresses the need for focusing on processes that take place in systems for consistency checking, leading to anomaly 
detection. 
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